Putting truth into words, but not into statements

(Now reading: Jean Grondin, The Philosophy of Gadamer)

Making a statement is always a dangerous thing to do. Statements can be taken out of context, distorting or obscuring the message one means to communicate in a statement. We cannot say anything without putting it into words, but it would be a mistake to confuse the words we say (that is, the words we have said already, in the past) with what we are saying. In other words, ongoing conversation is a much better way of expressing and uncovering truth and meaning than a fixed doctrinal statement. Which is one of the reasons I object to creeds and confessions of faith in the Church, when we take them to be authoritative statements that capture and contain the truth. Truth is bigger than any finite box we can make to put it in.

Truth can be put into words, but it cannot be put into any finished set of words, only into an unfinished, ongoing conversation.

The Idolatry of Modernity and the Impossibile State

In the concluding chapter of his book The Impossible State, Wael B. Hallaq argues that the crisis of the Muslim world is not a uniquely Muslim crisis, but is the crisis faced by all of humanity in our present times. This crisis stems from modernity, from Enlightenment philosophy, from a humanism that says “man is the measure of all things”.

Hallaq presents two worldviews in fundamental contradiction to one another. On the one hand, we have a theology that says we live in a universe saturated with moral values, with reasons that make normative demands of us (165). These moral demands transcend human subjectivity: they are part of the created world in which we live, and they come from God, the only Sovereign. On the other hand, we have a humanism that says we live in a value-free universe, and that the only moral constraints on us have their origin in human Reason.

World Philosophy Day 2012 at the University of Toledo

UNESCO World Philosophy Day in Toledo
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Public Philosophy that you participate in!

Thursday, November 15, 2012
The University of Toledo
2012  “Irrationality and the Future”

Field House  2420
10—11:00 am
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION.
Master’s Program Students,
“Philosophical Thinking About Irrationality and Problem-solving,”
 

11—11:45 am
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION,
Joshua Skorburg,
“HAVE YOU LOST YOUR MIND? EXTERNALISM AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE”


12  Noon—12:45 pm
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY KEYNOTE PRESENTATION,
Dr. Maureen Linker, UMichigan—Dearborn
“WHY SHOULD IDEAL REASONERS BECOME EVIL COMPUTERS?”


2—2:45 pm   SESSION 4 /a,  Field House  2420
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION,
Stephanie Lee,
“THE IMMANENCE OF LANGUAGE IN SOCIAL PROCESS”

2---2:45 pm, SESSION 4 /b,  Field House  2260
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION,
Dr. Susan Purviance,
“THE PLIGHT OF OTHERS AND SELF-CONCERN: CH’AN BUDDHIST AND SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY”


6---6:45 pm  Scott Hall 1004
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION,
Scott Coulter,
“ WONG’S PLURALISM AND DIVERSE MENNONITE MORALITIES REGARDING HOMOSEXUALITY”

C. S. Lewis and David B. Wong on Morality and Natural Impulses

It seems to me these passages are talking about the same thing. Morality is that which directs our impulses when those impulses conflict. Morality helps guide choice and action.

C. S. Lewis on Instincts and the Moral Law

(at Google Books)

[S]ome people wrote to me saying, ‘Isn’t what you call the Moral Law simply our herd instinct and hasn’t it been developed just like all our other instincts?’ Now I do not deny that we may have a herd instinct: but that is not what I mean by the Moral Law.  We all know what it feels like to be prompted by instinct—by mother love, or sexual instinct, or the instinct for food. It means that you feel a strong want or desire to act in a certain way. And, of course, we sometimes do feel just that sort of desire to help another person: and no doubt that desire is due to herd instinct. But feeling a desire to help is quite different from feeling that you ought to help whether you want to or not. Supposing you hear a cry for help from a man in danger. You will probably feel two desires—one a desire to give help (due to your herd instinct), the other a desire to keep out of danger (due to the instinct for self-preservation). But you will find inside you, in addition to these two impulses, a third thing which tells you that you ought to follow the impulse to help, and suppress the impulse to run away. Now this thing that judges between two instincts, that decides which should be encouraged, cannot itself be either of them. You might as well say that the sheet of music which tells you, at a given moment, to play one note on the piano and not another, is itself one of the notes on the keyboard. The Moral Law tells us the tune we have to play: our instincts are merely the keys. (C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 9-10)

David B. Wong on Morality and Natural Drives

(at Google Books)

This intrapersonal function of morality comprehends what has been called “the ethical,” as opposed to what might be called the “narrowly moral.” Morality in the broader sense used here comprehends the ethical. This part of morality helps human beings to structure their lives together in a larger sense, that is, not just for the sake of coordinating with each other but also for the sake of coordination within themselves. Because the natural drives of human beings are diffuse and general, and because they are diverse and are liable to come into conflict with each other, there is a need for a shaping of these drives, and much of it comes from people telling each other just how these drives should be shaped and how internal conflicts should be regulated and resolved. (David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 43)

Wong on a different direction for moral philosophy

"Not all moral values that are well grounded for us need to be well grounded for all human beings in all ages and places. It will be argued in chapter 6 that values can be grounded in such a way that they are suitable for human beings under certain sets of broadly defined circumstances, though not necessarily for human beings under all historically known circumstances, much less all conceivable circumstances.
"However, showing that adopting our moral values is one way to flourish requires us to meet certain challenges.... My point here is that this is the sort of task we must engage in if we are to sustain confidence in our moral commitments. It is a task that many moral philosophers have thought to be irrelevant to confidence, opting instead for very abstract universalistic justifications of our morality. If I am right, moral philosophy needs to take a different direction, one that is more closely related to political theory and to certain versions of poststructuralism and critical theory." (Wong, Natural Moralities, 109-110)

I take Wong to be saying that taking seriously the situational character of morality makes the work of moral philosophy more challenging and more important. It is not about finding a few universal principles that ground our norms of right and wrong, of giving precedence to one kind of value over another. It is about understanding the concrete specifics of our situation: our location in history, in the present, in this time and place, in relation to other individuals and other societies and other cultures (with other moralities), and it is about understanding how these concrete specifics determine the basis for our morality.

Wong on the Value of Community in Individualistic, Democratic Societies

Not only is there fruit to be gained from considering communal-ground arguments for individual rights (so that we might see effective ways to secure rights for individuals in collectivist societies), but also rights-centered/individualist moralities should recognize the importance of community for democracy.

In particular, the democratic values of self-governance and social justice (i.e. “justice for all”) require community. Unchecked individualism threatens to erode the ability of individuals to exercise their rights of self-governance and equal access to justice.

Wong writes in his section 3.7, “The Interdependence of Rights and Community” (p. 92, my emphasis):

“Consider Tocqueville’s definition of individualism as a “calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends,” such that “with this little society formed to his taste he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.” Such people, Tocqueville observed, form “the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their hands.” They come to “forget their ancestors” and also their descendants, as well as isolating themselves from their contemporaries. “Each man is forever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude of his own heart.” (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. Mayer [New York: Doubleday, 1969), 506, 508).

“Tocqueville’s prescience concerning our isolation from our contemporaries and our descendants is reflected in the national unwillingness to address the problem of a potentially permanent class of the severely disadvantaged beset by poverty, crime, and drugs. It is not just political participation at stake here but more basically a question of moral agency and integrity. … [R]ights-centered moralities [must] recognize the indispensability of community for the realization of democratic values of self-governance and social justice. Rights and community are interdependent.”

Sexual Egalitarianism in Collectivistic Societies

In section 3.6 of Natural Moralities, “Community-Centered Moralities and the Problem of Hierarchy”, Wong provides examples to argue for the possibility of a communal ground for egalitarianism. Especially, he argues that sexism is not an inevitable piece of a collectivistic/communitarian society. Individualism and an ethics of individual autonomy is not the only way to argue for egalitarianism.

“[O]ne could forcefully argue from within the tradition that the subordination of women unnecessarily restricts the ways in which women can make a contribution to the common moral ends of the community and deprives them of the dignity that would come from making such a contribution.” (90)

Wong refers to the retelling of the traditional Chinese ballad of a young woman taking her aged father’s place when he is called to the army, in the story “White Tigers” by Maxine Hong Kingston. This story juxtaposes the traditional Chinese values of filial piety (that is, respect for parents) and communal identity with a critique of sexism in traditional Chinese society, demanding that women be given fully equal opportunity to realize these traditional communitarian values. 

Wong also gives the example of the community of Ammouliani in Greece. In this traditional society, “the primary fulfillment of the individual is found in the family and tied to the socially desirable goals of marriage, childbearing, and the building of a future for one’s children” (91). Women are valued in this society for their financial and managerial skill, and take an equal (or in some cases, greater) role with their husbands in the economic independence of their household. “And yet this unusual status for women is not achieved through recognition of rights that women have against the family or their husbands. Rather, it is through recognition of the ability of women to contribute to the enterprise that is the primary fulfillment of both men and women” (91).

The Telos of Democratic Freedoms (more on communitarian & individualist notions of rights)

(This morning I am reading David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, section 3.5, "The Communal Ground for Rights".)

According to Andrew Nathan's study of Chinese conceptions of democracy, democratic freedoms (the kind that enable meaningful political participation, such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to influence public policy) ought to be in service of the common good. I think of this as a statement about the telos or purpose of democratic freedoms. That is, we ought to do more as citizens than merely insist that we be free from certain forms of coercion or from certain types of obligation--we ought to ask what we are free for.

Nathan writes (interpreting Chinese political thinker Liang Qichao):

"[T]he duties of citizens are to love and be concerned about the nation. Hence political participation should unelash energies that will contribute to the colelctive welfare; it would not--as a Westerner might see it--enable individuals to pursue personal interests that might be competitive with that welfare" (quoted by Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 86).

So, on this view: democratic freedoms are for the promotion of the common good; democratic freedoms are not for enabling the assertion of individual self-interest in competition with the common good.

It strikes me that this conception of the telos of democratic freedoms should have implications for how we as American citizens, as Ohio citizens, etc., think about economic policy, and other social policies. Is my entitlement to earn income and to keep my earnings, or my entitlement to generate profits and to keep my profits, a right we see as serving the promotion of the common good? That is, does our protection and assertion of this right help create and maintain a sustainable economy that promotes and/or secures the well-being of all members of society (including the disenfranchised and oppressed)? Or, does our protection and assertion of this right (to create and keep personal profit/wealth) serve instead the promotion of one's individual self-interest in competition with the common good?

I believe these thoughts should influence both how we defend our rights (our right to work, our right to keep our earnings, our right to personal property), and what we do with these rights.

Reasonable people may continue to disagree about both; my hope is that these thoughts will generate and shape civil and productive conversation among citizens and neighbors with diverse moral and political views.

Two Different Grounds for Individual Rights

In moral philosophy and in current popular U.S. political discourse, I see a conflict between two moralities: (1) a morality that emphasizes the protection of individual liberties on the one hand (call this classical liberalism, individualism, libertarianism, or rights-centered morality), and (2) a morality that emphasizes the promotion of the common good on the other hand (call this communitarianism, collectivism, or social-welfare-centered morality). In popular U.S. political discourse, individualism might be represented by my friends who are most concerned that individual workers and business-owners be permitted to earn profit, keep profit, and have great freedom in what they do with their profit, while collectivism might be represented by my friends who are most concerned that everyone have enough food, shelter, and access to good education—including those whose economic situation does not permit them to secure these goods for themselves by earning personal profit through wage or investment income. I believe that (at least for the most part) all of my friends, on both sides of this conflict, think that the enactment of their own philosophy would tend to promote a society in which human beings are respected as having inherent moral worth as human beings (regardless of their socio-economic status), and to promote a sustainable and equitable economy in which resources are fairly distributed and in which there is enough for everyone’s basic needs to be met.

 

David B. Wong explores the relationship between community-centered and rights-centered moralities in his Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (Oxford, 2006).

New Waves in Truth, edited by Cory D. Wright and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) - Book Preview

New Waves in Truth (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) contains eighteen recent essays by twenty young researchers doing work in the theory of truth. The editors’ introduction shows significant diversity in the positions and directions taken by these 21^st century philosophers. One theme which runs throughout most of the volume is deflationism about truth. As the editors mention, “truth theorists have offered up a dizzying array of characterizations of deflationism” (3). The reader who wishes better to understand the current discussion of deflationism must realize the discussion is not simply comprised of the advocates and the critics of deflationism, arrayed in opposition to one another; each advocate and each critic may be talking about something rather different when they talk about deflationism. As a beginning, however, the reader may understand deflationism as the position that speakers predicate truth to statements for linguistic convenience and that truth is not a substantive property of propositions.

In addition to discussing deflationism, the contributors to this volume have written essays considering: the value of truth (i.e., What is truth good for? What makes the goal of believing what is true worthwhile?), different notions of what falsity is, whether truth is bivalent (i.e., Are true and false the only two truth values?), pluralist and monist theories of truth, truth in the domain of moral judgments and in the domain of color judgments, and the relationship between necessity and analyticity.

I anticipate the readings in this volume to be challenging and rather technical. I am somewhat interested in better understanding what deflationism is (and whether some form of “inflationism” might be superior after all), but I am particularly interested in the relevance of contemporary philosophical discussion about truth to ethics, theory of value, and to realist-pragmatist dialogue in epistemology and metaphysics.

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Editors’ Bios

Cory D. Wright received his Ph.D. in Philosophy & Cognitive Science from University of California San Diego in 2007, and teaches philosophy at California State University Long Beach. His research interests are primarily in Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy of Psychology. He has published recent articles on pluralism about truth.

Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen received his Ph.D. from the University of St. Andrews in 2006, and does research at the University of California Los Angeles and at københavns universitet in Denmark. His research interests are primarily in Epistemology, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Logic, and Metaphysics. He has also published recent articles on pluralism about truth.[1]

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[1] New Waves, x.

Word Journal: "moral relativism"

Moral relativism is the denial of moral universalism: that there is only one true morality.[1] If a morality is a (formal or informal) system of norms for judging choices and actions, policies and character-dispositions, and the like, as morally good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious—then moral relativism says two things: first, (1) more than one morality is correct, and second, (2) there are different, but equally correct moralities which judge the same act, by the same agent, in the same circumstances, as having opposite moral qualities.[2] That is: there are some acts that are morally right according to one correct morality and morally wrong according to another, equally correct morality.[3]

The proponent of moral relativism need not say that every actual morality is equally correct. Some moralities may be superior to others. This kind of relativism must deploy some set of norms to judge moralities, and (presumably) these norms will not be moral norms themselves. That is, the judgment that one morality is inferior that that another morality is superior is (presumably) not itself a moral judgment.[4]

According to the “pluralistic relativism” of David B. Wong, the truth conditions of a moral judgment (e.g. “It is morally right that Sarah obey her mother in this case”) vary from one morality to the next because the meanings of moral concepts (such as moral rightness) are relative to a morality’s norms specifying, for example, when the value of honoring parents is overridden by values of privacy and autonomy, or vice versa. Since different moralities place more or less relative importance on different values, what it means to have an overriding moral reason for an action is not the same in every correct morality. The moral judgments of parties representing different moralities may be in practical conflict while both being true because each applies a different concept of moral rightness. There are, however, universal constraints on moralities, derived from human nature and from the functions of morality. A culture’s concept of rightness could not be recognized as a proper moral concept if it did not meet these universal constraints.[5]

On Gilbert Harman’s version of moral relativism, the meaning of the moral concepts employed in a moral judgment is determined by an implicit agreement about moral norms between the one issuing the judgment and the agent whose action is being judged. This “pure version” of relativism does not allow moral judgments properly to be made about the actions of an agent who is outside of the judge’s community. In Harman’s view, only those who share the same implicit agreements about moral norms can be in genuine moral disagreement.[6]

The following are some objections that may be raised against moral relativism. (1) Moral relativism makes nonsense of claims of moral improvement: for example, the claim that the dominant American morality of today which recognizes the moral wrongness of slavery is an improvement over the dominant American morality of the 18^th century which regarded slavery as morally permissible. (2) Moral relativism cannot make sense of one’s making a moral judgment fallibilistically: that is, sincerely judging something is morally right while acknowledging that one’s judgment may be in error. (3) Moral relativism denies the phenomenon of genuine moral disagreement by relativizing moral truth: when parties disagree, says relativism, each one’s judgment is true relative to her own morality. Yet in real cases of moral disagreement each party judges the other to be mistaken categorically, and not just in error relative to one’s own moral standards. (4) Moral relativism undermines the normative force of morality: why should someone do what even her own community’s moral norms says she ought to do, if it is just as good for her to do what some other morality says she ought to do instead?

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[1] David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, p. xii.

[2] A theory that embraces the first claim but not the second would be a pluralistic but not a relativistic theory of morality. Suppose one holds that there is a correct deontological moral system and a correct consequentialist moral system, and that there is no rational basis for judging one system to be superior or more correct than the other. If it turns out, however, that there is no practical difference between the two systems: if, that is, exactly the same set of actions is morally right in each system, then this is pluralism without relativism.

[3] Not every act must be judged to have opposite moral qualities in different moralities. Moralities can be significantly different without being opposed to one another in every moral judgment.

[4] The cognitive expressivists Simon Blackburn, Mark Timmons, and Terry Horgan, however, seem to say there is no standard for judging another group’s morality that is not itself a moral standard. On this view, it seems difficult to justify the moral standard one applies to the judgment of another’s morality—or, indeed, to justify one’s positive judgment of one’s own morality. But perhaps one’s endorsement or adoption of a morality is not the kind of thing that admits of or requires justification?

[5] Wong, Natural Moralities, pp. 71-73.

[6] Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 74, interpreting Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended,” Philosophical Review 84 (1975):3-22, and Harman’s contribution to Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996), pp. 32-46.