Wong on the Value of Community in Individualistic, Democratic Societies

Not only is there fruit to be gained from considering communal-ground arguments for individual rights (so that we might see effective ways to secure rights for individuals in collectivist societies), but also rights-centered/individualist moralities should recognize the importance of community for democracy.

In particular, the democratic values of self-governance and social justice (i.e. “justice for all”) require community. Unchecked individualism threatens to erode the ability of individuals to exercise their rights of self-governance and equal access to justice.

Wong writes in his section 3.7, “The Interdependence of Rights and Community” (p. 92, my emphasis):

“Consider Tocqueville’s definition of individualism as a “calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends,” such that “with this little society formed to his taste he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.” Such people, Tocqueville observed, form “the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their hands.” They come to “forget their ancestors” and also their descendants, as well as isolating themselves from their contemporaries. “Each man is forever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude of his own heart.” (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. Mayer [New York: Doubleday, 1969), 506, 508).

“Tocqueville’s prescience concerning our isolation from our contemporaries and our descendants is reflected in the national unwillingness to address the problem of a potentially permanent class of the severely disadvantaged beset by poverty, crime, and drugs. It is not just political participation at stake here but more basically a question of moral agency and integrity. … [R]ights-centered moralities [must] recognize the indispensability of community for the realization of democratic values of self-governance and social justice. Rights and community are interdependent.”

Sexual Egalitarianism in Collectivistic Societies

In section 3.6 of Natural Moralities, “Community-Centered Moralities and the Problem of Hierarchy”, Wong provides examples to argue for the possibility of a communal ground for egalitarianism. Especially, he argues that sexism is not an inevitable piece of a collectivistic/communitarian society. Individualism and an ethics of individual autonomy is not the only way to argue for egalitarianism.

“[O]ne could forcefully argue from within the tradition that the subordination of women unnecessarily restricts the ways in which women can make a contribution to the common moral ends of the community and deprives them of the dignity that would come from making such a contribution.” (90)

Wong refers to the retelling of the traditional Chinese ballad of a young woman taking her aged father’s place when he is called to the army, in the story “White Tigers” by Maxine Hong Kingston. This story juxtaposes the traditional Chinese values of filial piety (that is, respect for parents) and communal identity with a critique of sexism in traditional Chinese society, demanding that women be given fully equal opportunity to realize these traditional communitarian values. 

Wong also gives the example of the community of Ammouliani in Greece. In this traditional society, “the primary fulfillment of the individual is found in the family and tied to the socially desirable goals of marriage, childbearing, and the building of a future for one’s children” (91). Women are valued in this society for their financial and managerial skill, and take an equal (or in some cases, greater) role with their husbands in the economic independence of their household. “And yet this unusual status for women is not achieved through recognition of rights that women have against the family or their husbands. Rather, it is through recognition of the ability of women to contribute to the enterprise that is the primary fulfillment of both men and women” (91).

The Telos of Democratic Freedoms (more on communitarian & individualist notions of rights)

(This morning I am reading David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, section 3.5, "The Communal Ground for Rights".)

According to Andrew Nathan's study of Chinese conceptions of democracy, democratic freedoms (the kind that enable meaningful political participation, such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to influence public policy) ought to be in service of the common good. I think of this as a statement about the telos or purpose of democratic freedoms. That is, we ought to do more as citizens than merely insist that we be free from certain forms of coercion or from certain types of obligation--we ought to ask what we are free for.

Nathan writes (interpreting Chinese political thinker Liang Qichao):

"[T]he duties of citizens are to love and be concerned about the nation. Hence political participation should unelash energies that will contribute to the colelctive welfare; it would not--as a Westerner might see it--enable individuals to pursue personal interests that might be competitive with that welfare" (quoted by Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 86).

So, on this view: democratic freedoms are for the promotion of the common good; democratic freedoms are not for enabling the assertion of individual self-interest in competition with the common good.

It strikes me that this conception of the telos of democratic freedoms should have implications for how we as American citizens, as Ohio citizens, etc., think about economic policy, and other social policies. Is my entitlement to earn income and to keep my earnings, or my entitlement to generate profits and to keep my profits, a right we see as serving the promotion of the common good? That is, does our protection and assertion of this right help create and maintain a sustainable economy that promotes and/or secures the well-being of all members of society (including the disenfranchised and oppressed)? Or, does our protection and assertion of this right (to create and keep personal profit/wealth) serve instead the promotion of one's individual self-interest in competition with the common good?

I believe these thoughts should influence both how we defend our rights (our right to work, our right to keep our earnings, our right to personal property), and what we do with these rights.

Reasonable people may continue to disagree about both; my hope is that these thoughts will generate and shape civil and productive conversation among citizens and neighbors with diverse moral and political views.

Two Different Grounds for Individual Rights

In moral philosophy and in current popular U.S. political discourse, I see a conflict between two moralities: (1) a morality that emphasizes the protection of individual liberties on the one hand (call this classical liberalism, individualism, libertarianism, or rights-centered morality), and (2) a morality that emphasizes the promotion of the common good on the other hand (call this communitarianism, collectivism, or social-welfare-centered morality). In popular U.S. political discourse, individualism might be represented by my friends who are most concerned that individual workers and business-owners be permitted to earn profit, keep profit, and have great freedom in what they do with their profit, while collectivism might be represented by my friends who are most concerned that everyone have enough food, shelter, and access to good education—including those whose economic situation does not permit them to secure these goods for themselves by earning personal profit through wage or investment income. I believe that (at least for the most part) all of my friends, on both sides of this conflict, think that the enactment of their own philosophy would tend to promote a society in which human beings are respected as having inherent moral worth as human beings (regardless of their socio-economic status), and to promote a sustainable and equitable economy in which resources are fairly distributed and in which there is enough for everyone’s basic needs to be met.

 

David B. Wong explores the relationship between community-centered and rights-centered moralities in his Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (Oxford, 2006).