C. S. Lewis and David B. Wong on Morality and Natural Impulses

It seems to me these passages are talking about the same thing. Morality is that which directs our impulses when those impulses conflict. Morality helps guide choice and action.

C. S. Lewis on Instincts and the Moral Law

(at Google Books)

[S]ome people wrote to me saying, ‘Isn’t what you call the Moral Law simply our herd instinct and hasn’t it been developed just like all our other instincts?’ Now I do not deny that we may have a herd instinct: but that is not what I mean by the Moral Law.  We all know what it feels like to be prompted by instinct—by mother love, or sexual instinct, or the instinct for food. It means that you feel a strong want or desire to act in a certain way. And, of course, we sometimes do feel just that sort of desire to help another person: and no doubt that desire is due to herd instinct. But feeling a desire to help is quite different from feeling that you ought to help whether you want to or not. Supposing you hear a cry for help from a man in danger. You will probably feel two desires—one a desire to give help (due to your herd instinct), the other a desire to keep out of danger (due to the instinct for self-preservation). But you will find inside you, in addition to these two impulses, a third thing which tells you that you ought to follow the impulse to help, and suppress the impulse to run away. Now this thing that judges between two instincts, that decides which should be encouraged, cannot itself be either of them. You might as well say that the sheet of music which tells you, at a given moment, to play one note on the piano and not another, is itself one of the notes on the keyboard. The Moral Law tells us the tune we have to play: our instincts are merely the keys. (C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 9-10)

David B. Wong on Morality and Natural Drives

(at Google Books)

This intrapersonal function of morality comprehends what has been called “the ethical,” as opposed to what might be called the “narrowly moral.” Morality in the broader sense used here comprehends the ethical. This part of morality helps human beings to structure their lives together in a larger sense, that is, not just for the sake of coordinating with each other but also for the sake of coordination within themselves. Because the natural drives of human beings are diffuse and general, and because they are diverse and are liable to come into conflict with each other, there is a need for a shaping of these drives, and much of it comes from people telling each other just how these drives should be shaped and how internal conflicts should be regulated and resolved. (David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 43)

Wong on a different direction for moral philosophy

"Not all moral values that are well grounded for us need to be well grounded for all human beings in all ages and places. It will be argued in chapter 6 that values can be grounded in such a way that they are suitable for human beings under certain sets of broadly defined circumstances, though not necessarily for human beings under all historically known circumstances, much less all conceivable circumstances.
"However, showing that adopting our moral values is one way to flourish requires us to meet certain challenges.... My point here is that this is the sort of task we must engage in if we are to sustain confidence in our moral commitments. It is a task that many moral philosophers have thought to be irrelevant to confidence, opting instead for very abstract universalistic justifications of our morality. If I am right, moral philosophy needs to take a different direction, one that is more closely related to political theory and to certain versions of poststructuralism and critical theory." (Wong, Natural Moralities, 109-110)

I take Wong to be saying that taking seriously the situational character of morality makes the work of moral philosophy more challenging and more important. It is not about finding a few universal principles that ground our norms of right and wrong, of giving precedence to one kind of value over another. It is about understanding the concrete specifics of our situation: our location in history, in the present, in this time and place, in relation to other individuals and other societies and other cultures (with other moralities), and it is about understanding how these concrete specifics determine the basis for our morality.

Wong on the Value of Community in Individualistic, Democratic Societies

Not only is there fruit to be gained from considering communal-ground arguments for individual rights (so that we might see effective ways to secure rights for individuals in collectivist societies), but also rights-centered/individualist moralities should recognize the importance of community for democracy.

In particular, the democratic values of self-governance and social justice (i.e. “justice for all”) require community. Unchecked individualism threatens to erode the ability of individuals to exercise their rights of self-governance and equal access to justice.

Wong writes in his section 3.7, “The Interdependence of Rights and Community” (p. 92, my emphasis):

“Consider Tocqueville’s definition of individualism as a “calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends,” such that “with this little society formed to his taste he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.” Such people, Tocqueville observed, form “the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their hands.” They come to “forget their ancestors” and also their descendants, as well as isolating themselves from their contemporaries. “Each man is forever thrown back on himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude of his own heart.” (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. Mayer [New York: Doubleday, 1969), 506, 508).

“Tocqueville’s prescience concerning our isolation from our contemporaries and our descendants is reflected in the national unwillingness to address the problem of a potentially permanent class of the severely disadvantaged beset by poverty, crime, and drugs. It is not just political participation at stake here but more basically a question of moral agency and integrity. … [R]ights-centered moralities [must] recognize the indispensability of community for the realization of democratic values of self-governance and social justice. Rights and community are interdependent.”

Sexual Egalitarianism in Collectivistic Societies

In section 3.6 of Natural Moralities, “Community-Centered Moralities and the Problem of Hierarchy”, Wong provides examples to argue for the possibility of a communal ground for egalitarianism. Especially, he argues that sexism is not an inevitable piece of a collectivistic/communitarian society. Individualism and an ethics of individual autonomy is not the only way to argue for egalitarianism.

“[O]ne could forcefully argue from within the tradition that the subordination of women unnecessarily restricts the ways in which women can make a contribution to the common moral ends of the community and deprives them of the dignity that would come from making such a contribution.” (90)

Wong refers to the retelling of the traditional Chinese ballad of a young woman taking her aged father’s place when he is called to the army, in the story “White Tigers” by Maxine Hong Kingston. This story juxtaposes the traditional Chinese values of filial piety (that is, respect for parents) and communal identity with a critique of sexism in traditional Chinese society, demanding that women be given fully equal opportunity to realize these traditional communitarian values. 

Wong also gives the example of the community of Ammouliani in Greece. In this traditional society, “the primary fulfillment of the individual is found in the family and tied to the socially desirable goals of marriage, childbearing, and the building of a future for one’s children” (91). Women are valued in this society for their financial and managerial skill, and take an equal (or in some cases, greater) role with their husbands in the economic independence of their household. “And yet this unusual status for women is not achieved through recognition of rights that women have against the family or their husbands. Rather, it is through recognition of the ability of women to contribute to the enterprise that is the primary fulfillment of both men and women” (91).

The Telos of Democratic Freedoms (more on communitarian & individualist notions of rights)

(This morning I am reading David B. Wong, Natural Moralities, section 3.5, "The Communal Ground for Rights".)

According to Andrew Nathan's study of Chinese conceptions of democracy, democratic freedoms (the kind that enable meaningful political participation, such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to influence public policy) ought to be in service of the common good. I think of this as a statement about the telos or purpose of democratic freedoms. That is, we ought to do more as citizens than merely insist that we be free from certain forms of coercion or from certain types of obligation--we ought to ask what we are free for.

Nathan writes (interpreting Chinese political thinker Liang Qichao):

"[T]he duties of citizens are to love and be concerned about the nation. Hence political participation should unelash energies that will contribute to the colelctive welfare; it would not--as a Westerner might see it--enable individuals to pursue personal interests that might be competitive with that welfare" (quoted by Wong, Natural Moralities, p. 86).

So, on this view: democratic freedoms are for the promotion of the common good; democratic freedoms are not for enabling the assertion of individual self-interest in competition with the common good.

It strikes me that this conception of the telos of democratic freedoms should have implications for how we as American citizens, as Ohio citizens, etc., think about economic policy, and other social policies. Is my entitlement to earn income and to keep my earnings, or my entitlement to generate profits and to keep my profits, a right we see as serving the promotion of the common good? That is, does our protection and assertion of this right help create and maintain a sustainable economy that promotes and/or secures the well-being of all members of society (including the disenfranchised and oppressed)? Or, does our protection and assertion of this right (to create and keep personal profit/wealth) serve instead the promotion of one's individual self-interest in competition with the common good?

I believe these thoughts should influence both how we defend our rights (our right to work, our right to keep our earnings, our right to personal property), and what we do with these rights.

Reasonable people may continue to disagree about both; my hope is that these thoughts will generate and shape civil and productive conversation among citizens and neighbors with diverse moral and political views.